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ABSTRACT 
Global information and communications technologies create criminal opportunities in which criminal 
violation and physical proximity are decoupled. As in all our endeavors, the good become the prey 
of the bad. Murderous and venal exploitation of ICT has followed from the inception of the Internet , 
threatening all the good it brings and the trust we need so badly as a people. As the work continues 
to expand the implementation of Smart Cities and the Internet of Things, there will be more 
opportunities for exploitation of these technologies. We examine the social and liberty risks our data 
and technology-driven responses may entail. 
Keywords: Big data, analytics, privacy, information polity 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The growth and distribution of 
internetworked, instrumented objects feeding 
into an intelligent framework for analysis 
offer tremendous benefits. These include 
smart traffic management , smart logistic 
scheduling, smart policing, smart corrections 
and all the myriad of services that can benefit 
from structured, algorithmic analysis and 
implementation. The growth in analytic 
power and inference depends on data 
generated in Smart Cities and the objects of 
the Internet of Things. With all these benefits 
we must consider the increased risks of 
criminal conduct towards personal security 
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and of state overreaching that may shift the 
balance between state and citizen. 
This is particularly true where 
components of this implement geographic 
information system analysis. In the game of 
who-when-where-what-how, the foundation 
of all investigation and reporting, GIS data 
can connect the where and when to who and 
what , either directly or inferentially. The 
richness of this spatio-temporal data 
modelling and statistical inference challenges 
social and legal bounds, especially of 
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privacy and 
personal security. 
We must consider the systems as a Socio-
Technical System for Governance and 
address evolving standards of conduct. And 
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we must consider these for the future as these 
technologies--- analytics, data generation and 
data collection ---grow in power. 
Figure 1. Temporal Considerations for Effective Policy 
Development 
2. LEGAL REGilVIE OF 
INFORMATION 
One key area are the protections associated 
with values of privacy and personal 
autonomy. Both civil and common law have 
for centuries protected these from intrusion, 
with doctrines relating to trespass and 
trespass to chattels up to sui generis video 
voyeurism statutes. This reflects direct 
invasion of those interests as well as the use 
of the invasion for other injuries. For 
example, the United States Congress enacted 
legislation to prohibit states from selling the 
information of individuals receiving motor 
vehicle licenses; although quite profitable for 
the states, this information was used to stalk, 
assault and murder the citizens of those 
states. 
These have been issues of policy and law 
throughout the evolution of informational 
technologies. For GIS, Onsrud, Johnson and 
Lopez (1994) observed that personal privacy 
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is a social issue of increasing relevance to the 
geographic information system community 
where specific privacy protection practices 
are needed. 
Within the GIS community, Cho (2005) 
discussed overall legal issues within the data 
sphere of spatiotemporal information. This 
examined general law and policy, data 
sharing concerns, privacy interests and 
liability for injuries to life, liberty, and 
property from the application of these 
technologies. This addressed the impact of 
jurisdiction ( domestic, international, 
transnational), property 
interests/ intellectual property and contract 
law within these regimes. 
As with issues of governance generally, 
and with the interaction of new technologies 
with social life in particular, we begin to see 
an important and interconnected relationship 
between research within disciplines of 
knowledge analysis, the practical use of those 
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systems and the legal/ ethical implications of 
that use. 
I \ 
Figure 2 Interrelationship of Research, Practice and Law / Ethics in Polity 
Governance 
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These reflect the importance of 
considering consequences, both historical and 
potential, the allocation of responsibility for 
those consequences and the role of 
governance in balancing the competing 
interests at issue. They are all interrelated: 
ethics and outcomes drive policy, which 
drives political responses which drive legal 
results which, if not perfect ( and they never 
are) lead to new policies. 
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Figure 3 Process of governance in an 
information polity 
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2 .1 Analysis and hn.plica.tions 
under the Laws of the United 
States 
Under American law, no citizen may be 
deprived of life liberty or property without the 
due process of law, a constitutional guarantee of 
fundamental fairness. Issues of due process were 
discussed in the United States Supreme Court 
cases of Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v 
Eldridge. The basic analysis that must take 
place is a trifold weighing of factors: 
1. what is the nature and extent of the 
injury to the individual by the state 
action, 
2. what is the risk of a wrongful outcome 
through the use of state action, and 
3. what is the nature and extent of the 
interest of the State in the matter at 
hand. 
The common law's flexibility is essential, for 
"time works changes, brings into existence new 
conditions and purposes" Olmstead v. United 
States , (1928) ( Justice Brandeis, dissenting). 
Justice Brandeis wrote a dissent which set the 
foundation for the subsequent evolution of the 
law to protect the rights of privacy; his prescient 
analysis is even more relevant for today: 
Subtler and more far-reaching means 
of invading privacy have become 
available to the Government. Discovery 
and invention have made it possible for 
the Government, by means far more 
effective than stretching upon the rack, 
to obtain disclosure in court of what is 
whispered in the closet. 
Moreover, "in the application of a 
constitution, our contemplation cannot 
be only of what has, been but of what 
may be." The progress of science in 
furnishing the Government with means 
of espionage is not likely to stop with 
wiretapping. Ways may someday be 
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developed by which the Government , 
without removing papers from secret 
drawers, can reproduce them in court, 
and by which it will be enabled to expose 
to a jury the most intimate occurrences 
of the home. Advances in the psychic 
and related sciences may bring means of 
exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts 
and emotions. "That places the liberty 
of every man in the hands of every petty 
officer" was said by James Otis of much 
lesser intrusions than these._ ... 
It is not the breaking of his doors, 
and the rummaging of his drawers, that 
constitutes the essence of the offence; 
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal 
liberty and private property, where that 
right has never been forfeited by his 
conviction of some public offence -- it is 
the invasion of this sacred right which 
underlies and constitutes the essence of 
Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into 
a house and opening boxes and drawers 
are circumstances of aggravation; but 
any forcible and compulsory extortion of 
a man's own testimony or of his private 
papers to be used as evidence of a crime 
or to forfeit his goods is within the 
condemnation of that judgment. In this 
regard, the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments run almost into each 
other.
Ultimately, the reasoning of Justice 
Brandeis prevailed and the Supreme Court 
overruled Olmstead, holding that the police 
interception of telephone calls was a violation of 
fundamental constitutional protections and an 
unreasonable search. In that case, Katz v. 
United States, (1967) the Supreme Court 
further detailed the fundamental test for 
judging the limits of government power: that a 
government search is unreasonable in violation 
of the fourth amendment when it violates a he 
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reasonable expectation of privacy, thereby 
moving this doctrine untethered from physical 
traditions. 
This analysis was repeated in a number of 
21st-century cases that define privacy interests 
against intrusion with the evolution of new 
technologies and new systems. Those cases 
include United States v. Jones (2012), North 
Carolina v. Grady (2015), where satellite 
monitoring was found to constitute a search 
under the Fourth Amendment and Riley v. 
California (2015). In Riley, cell phone searches 
incident to an arrest were found in proper, a 
change from earlier jurisprudence rules which 
permitted the search of an individual and their 
possessions once they were arrested. Riley v. 
California reflected Justice Sotomayor's 
observations in United States v. Jones that on 
GPS profiling power cited in support of the 
ultimate determination that under the Fourth 
Amendment there were greater limits on cell 
phone data searches than for less-data intensive 
artifacts. 
Although the Supreme Court ruled on 
traditional trespass grounds in United States v. 
Jones (2012) , the concurring opinions of Justice 
Sotomayor, considered a liberal jurist, and 
Justice Alito, considered a conservative jurist, 
analyzed the greater, future issues at stake in 
the growth of these new technologies. Justice 
Sotomayor noted that Katz v United States 
realigned the controlling test for modern privacy 
as protecting a person's reasonable-expectation-
of-privacy. Her greater concern - a system of 
inexpensive GIS for people could "alter the 
relationship between citizen and government in 
a way that is inimical to democratic society" via 
GPS data monitoring, aggregation and analysis: 
GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person's 
public movements that reflects a wealth 
of detail about her familial , political, 
professional, religious, and sexual 
associations. . .. The Government can 
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JDFSL V12N3 
store such records and efficiently mine 
them for information years into the 
future .... And because GPS monitoring 
is cheap in comparison to conventional 
surveillance techniques and, by design, 
proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the 
ordinary checks that constrain abusive 
law enforcement practices: "limited 
police resources and community 
hostility." Illinois v. Lidster 
Justice Alito expanded this analysis as to 
the instrumented devices contributing data to 
the geospatial corpus: CCTV, automated tolling 
systems, automobile automatic notifications 
systems, cellular telephones and other wireless 
devices. Joined by three other justices, he 
suggested that while short-term monitoring 
would be reasonable, longer-term it would be an 
illegal invasion of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment. As with electronic monitoring of 
communications, that this was an area open to 
Congressional legislation to establish privacy 
rights and the punishments for their violation. 
2.2 Leg-al Analysis for the Future 
There are a variety of factors to consider as to 
the way in which a governance structure within 
the information polity is rendered. Some of the 
individual elements that might be considered 
are: 
Data 
Analytics & Algorithms 
Rendition & Representation 
Systems ( collection, storage, analysis, 
rendition) 
Users and Use/ disclosure. 
Issues that relate to the individual datum or 
collected data can be constructed around their 
characteristics, such as mandates, prohibitions 
or special permissions on data. This may 
connect to systems aspects for the generation 
and collection of data. The use of data analytics 
and the algorithms which drive such analysis 
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has generally not been deeply scrutinized except 
where outputs produce clearly discriminatory 
results which may conflict with other 
regulations. 
There has been significant discussion about 
the inherent dangers of discriminatory 
programming, whether intentional or 
unintentional, that may produce inappropriate 
output. This may appear in the final rendition 
and representation of the data analysis. From 
this flows issues of who uses that analysis, how 
they use it or how they might disclose it to 
others along with any underlying data 
associated with it. 
A number of privacy regimes, such as those 
of the European Union, distilled this down to 
three general areas within which regulation is 
constructed. These general regulatory areas are 
1. data collection, 
2. data analytics and analysis, and 
3. data use and disclosure. 
Governance of the potential damage with 
the use of these systems may seek limitations 
within these areas and define granular 
regulations within them. 
This intersects with the police power of the 
state using such powerful data systems to 
promote public security. These analytics can be 
used for various types of state action. 
Limitations on state action vary with national 
law and, in some cases, the interrelationship 
with international treaty law, such as those 
enforced by the European Court of Human 
Rights. The examination of the implementation 
of data analytics into police action must 
consider the different requirements for any 
particular police action. The continuum of 
evidentiary weight that each type of police 
action requires is different for: 
Investigation 
Designation for further contact 
Designation as "person of interest" 
Page 72 
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Investigative detention 
P / C 
Arrest 
Search 
Indictment / Prosecution 
Trial 
Conviction 
At the same time, there are civil law 
restrictions on the infringement of personal 
autonomy that may be based on constitutional 
provisions, statutes or common-law practices. 
Liberty and personal autonomy as the rights of 
the citizens of a polity may look at the right to 
control access to and distribution of personal 
information of various types. 
The common-law tort of invasion of privacy 
is instructive in this regard under American law. 
Where the Second Restatement of Torts set this 
out as four 
fundamental 
distinct areas, 
areas that can 
it captures 
suffer from 
improper data analytics. Those are: 
The right to be free from the 
unwarranted appropriation or 
exploitation of one's personality, 
The publicizing of one's private affairs 
with which the public has no legitimate 
concern, 
The wrongful intrusion into one's 
private activities, in such manner as to 
outrage or cause mental suffering, 
shame, or humiliation to a person of 
ordinary sensibilities, or 
Being presented in a "false light." 
These areas may be mapped to these 
technologies and the potential damage they may 
cause. The publication of aspects of a person's 
private life with which the public has no 
legitimate concern or interest may come from 
analytics which reveal an intensely personal 
item, such as health, pregnancy or financial 
frailty, the disclosure of which is harmful and 
for which there is no need for someone to know. 
It does not matter if this is a truthful inference, 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
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it's that the disclosure is inappropriate. If made 
in violation of law that disclosure may lead to 
related statutory grounds for a privacy invasion. 
The privacy tort of "false light" represents 
another aspect of this , where a mis-inference , or 
erroneous inference from data analysis may 
incorrectly represent someone wrongly as to 
their status, state or conduct and thus injure 
them in a variety of ways. 
Where data analytics allow one to intrude 
into the private activities of someone, we may 
have an open question as to what would 
constitute a wrongful intrusion into that area; 
violation of statutory limitations on data 
processing and use that produce this might be 
such a tortious action. It is possible that a 
common-law violation may evolve with greater 
appreciation of the particulars of these new 
technologies and how they may infringe on one's 
personal sphere. 
And even violation of one's right of 
"publicity," or the unwarranted appropriation 
or exploitation of a person's personality, may be 
violated where mis-inferences are used m 
connection with disclosures relating to an 
individual. 
The admonition where Justice Brandeis said 
the right of privacy is the right to be let alone 
is all the more appropriate. Where data analysis 
meddles with the lives of others it does not leave 
them properly alone and society in law may 
need to correct that. 
3. DATA AS A POLITY 
CONCERN 
That this has become a matter of the proper 
governance of the polity is best seen in the 
policy white papers issued by the Office of the 
President of the United States under Barack 
Obama. In two papers, from 2014 and 2016, the 
office of the president set out the issues that 
must be addressed to maintain a proper balance 
between the government and the government. 
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The first white paper outlined how "big 
data," lawfully applied, would have significant 
benefits for public safety and national security. 
Yet it acknowledged that its use in these areas, 
manifested in "predictive analytics," must be 
regularly subjected to careful policy review as to 
the outcomes represented. The implementation 
and institutionalization of "best practices" 
protocols for data use and storage would be a 
foundation of this. The White House suggested 
that engagement of federal agencies with 
extensive experience in dealing with privacy and 
data practices could assist state local and other 
authorities in the proper use of these analytic 
technologies in accordance with law. This 
included the use of commercial data products. 
The second white paper drilled down into 
fundamental issues of system design as they 
related to data analytics for governance. The 
key challenges that must be addressed relate to 
the data that is processed by the system, the 
design of the algorithmic systems (including AI 
and machine learning technologies), and the 
way in which this data is used. It noted that 
these powerful data analytics were used for 
credit lending decisions, employment decisions, 
education, healthcare, and criminal justice. 
The risks began with data. Where the 
primary or initial data sets used poorly selected 
data, incomplete or incorrect data, data tainted 
by selection bias or internal inferential biases 
relating to historical practices, improper mis-
inferences may be the result of analysis against 
flawed data. The analytics systems themselves 
may be subject to inherent problems of 
evaluation and transparency. They may be 
"black box" technologies that vendors do not 
wish revealed or may not themselves fully 
understand. The systems themselves may have 
errors within the programming that may 
produce erroneous outcomes, at least in some 
situations. This risk is heightened with the 
growth of self-learning systems of "artificial 
intelligence" and machine learning algorithms 
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that may evolve without human intermediation 
to provide awareness of potential biases or 
errors. There is a risk the systems will repeat 
those biases and errors incorporated into past 
decisions reflected in the data. 
4. CONCLUSION 
How we balance the risks and benefits of 
massive data analytic technology will define the 
relationship between the government and the 
governed in the information polity, just as 
Justice Sotomayor said in United States v Jones. 
By failing to address these risks we may very 
well damage the liberties and democratic 
engagement we need to continue to be the 
people we are. This is clearly balanced against 
the risks of criminal and terroristic actions that 
threaten the peace and stability of our Republic. 
But we must address them, and fundamental for 
this is our willingness to address the impact of 
these new technologies on our rights and 
liberties, now and for the future. Failing to do 
may very well change who we are and who we 
want to be. 
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